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PROS 2015 Summer Meeting

2015 PROS Meeting will be in Texas.

A NASA tour is planned. You will love the Gulf Coast. Plan your meeting now, and have some fun too.

Read page two. News continues, don't stop on page one.


On July 30, 2014, at [0940 CDT], with the plant operating at 100% power, a review of an engineering analysis of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) determined that the UHS had been in an unanalyzed condition that degraded plant safety. This condition was the result of a design basis deficiency for the UHS that did not account for the adverse effects of system leakage on compliance with the 30-day inventory required by Regulatory Guide 1.27. The system design basis requires that 30-day inventory be maintained, with the assumption that no replenishment of the UHS occurs for the entire duration of the postulated event.

In support of the development of the engineering analysis, compensatory measures have been implemented which provide adequate assurance that the UHS will perform its design safety function. Corrective actions to restore full compliance with design basis requirements are in development.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that degraded the safety function of the UHS.


RX Type: [1] GE-6

Yankee’s last day reported as Dec. 29

BRATTLEBORO — Entergy Corp. plans to permanently shut down the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vernon on Dec. 29.

Michael McKenney, Vermont Yankee’s emergency preparedness manager, revealed the previously secret date Friday in a state meeting in Vernon with towns in the nuclear plant’s emergency evacuation zone.

Entergy spokesman Robert Williams was less precise Tuesday.

“We have a commitment in the settlement agreement to shut down by the end of the year,” he said in an email. “We are making internal plans consistent with that commitment, and currently assume the final downpower a short period before New Year’s Eve.”

He said, “We may adjust the precise date as we factor in the many scheduling priorities for safe shutdown.”

Entergy had last year described its shut-down date as “late in the fourth quarter,” of 2014 and then refined that to “late in December. ” But the company had been vague about how long it could continue operating with the nuclear fuel remaining in the reactor core.

Erica Bornemann, planning section chief for the state’s Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, said the meeting Friday was called to discuss the emergency planning budget.

Entergy had previously announced plans to all but eliminate emergency planning in surrounding towns starting in 2016.

Exelon Buys 21 Megawatts of Fuel Cells From Bloom Energy


Exelon Corp. (EXC), the largest U.S. producer of nuclear power, agreed to buy fuel-cell power plants with 21 megawatts of capacity that Bloom Energy Corp. plans to install at 75 corporate sites in four states.

Commercial customers including AT&T Inc. will purchase the electricity, often at a premium to a utility’s grid price, for each plant’s ability to provide power locally with less pollution and more reliability than the grid, said KR Sridhar, Bloom’s co-founder and chief executive officer.

The deal shows...

Exelon buying Integrys' retail electricity arm

Chicago Tribune

Nearly 1 million Chicagoans bid adieu to Exelon’s Commonwealth Edison last year, hoping to get a better deal from a new power company. A deal announced Wednesday will send them back into Exelon’s arms.

Exelon Corp. announced Wednesday it will pay... 

Lungmen No.1 nuclear reactor OK’d for sealing

Lungmen No.1 nuclear reactor OK’d for sealingLungmen Nuclear Power Plant in northeastern Taiwan will see its No. 1 reactor sealed and further construction halted until a decision can be reached on the facility's future in a national referendum.The No. 1 reactor at Lungmen Nuclear Power Plant in New Taipei City’s Gongliao District has been given a clean bill of health and is set for sealing next year, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs July 30.

The 126 systems of the unit underwent extensive preoperational testing and thorough re-examination based on 231 specific procedures from April 2013 to July this year. Key functions verified include containment, instrumentation and controls, peripheral support, power generation, safe shutdown and water cooling.

“Passing the rigorous review illustrates the high standards of care invested in the design and construction of the facility,” MOEA Minister Chang Chia-juch said at the conclusion of an expert meeting in Taipei City.

The reactor is expected to be mothballed for an initial phase of three years starting 2015. At the same time, construction of the No. 2 reactor in Lungmen will be suspended until the future of the facility is determined in a national referendum. The decision came after public concerns about the safety of nuclear power peaked in April this year.


The NRC sent out a letter to Region IV plants to inform the stations that effective July 27, 2014, Mr. Eric R. Oesterle was assigned the NRCs Acting Chief for Plant Licensing Branch IV-1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, through October 4, 2014, and has licensing oversight responsibility fRegion IV. Mr. Oesterle assumes all supervisory duties previously held by me as Chief of Plant Licensing Branch IV-1. Mr. Oesterle may be reached at 301-415-1014 or via e-mail at Eric.Oesterle@nrc.gov. 

Mr Oesterle, a Senior Policy Analyst has been a task force member on the Combined License Review Task Force in 2006 - 2007 for exploring efficiencies in new reactor license processes, Office of New Reactors. He was also a Project Manager in the Division of Reactor Licensing in the Infrustructor Branch, lead PM on DG-1145. The purpose of DG-1145 was to provide guidance to potential applicants for combined construction and operating licenses pursuant to Part 52.

Eric joined the NRC in 2005 as a Project Manager.


This report documents one violation for which the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion. The NRC is not taking enforcement action for this violation because it meets the criteria established in an NRC Memorandum from Barry C. Westreich, Director, Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to each regional office and Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Subject: Enhanced Guidance for Licensee Near-Term Corrective Actions to Address Cyber Security Inspection Findings and Licensee Eligibility for “Good-Faith” Attempt Discretion dated July 1, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13178A203). Consistent with the NRC Memorandum, you should inform Mr. Keith Young, the inspection team leader, in the Region I Office at 610-337-5293, when you complete and close corrective actions associated with this violation. Further, this report documents two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.


During NRC inspection activities conducted April 1 through June 30, 2014, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 70.61(e) states, in part, the safety program established in 70.62 of this subpart, shall ensure that each item relied on for safety (IROFS) will be available and reliable to perform its intended function when needed and in the context of the performance requirements of this section.

10 CFR Part 70.62(d) states, in part, that each licensee shall establish management measures to ensure compliance with the performance requirements. These measures shall ensure that IROFS will be available and reliable to perform its intended function when needed, to comply with performance requirements. One such management measure is configuration control, also known as an engineering change notice.

Section 11.4, Procedures Development and Implementation, states, in part, AREVA conducts its licensed activities in accordance with a system of written operating procedures. Activities involving licensed SNM and/or IROFS will be conducted in accordance with approved procedures.

NRC Conducting Inspection at Diablo Canyon due to LER

By Bob Meyer

NRC Conducting Inspection at Diablo Canyon due to LER. As a minimum the NRC will be looking at spurious operations that were identified during the NFPA-805 project, Appendix R, and procedures for both units. Interviews will be expected.

Here is the LER:

On October 14, 2013, at 15:11 PDT, with Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, Main Feedwater Pump 1-1 tripped. This event began when a 480 V bus overcurrent relay tripped during relay maintenance and caused a loss of control oil pressure which resulted in a main feedwater pump trip. In response, plant operators controlled a ramp from 100 percent to 50 percent power and manually started the auxiliary feedwater pumps per plant procedures and conditions. The auxiliary feedwater system actuation was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a) in NRC Event Notification 49442.

DCPP determined that the cause of the relay trip was failure to incorporate operating experience in the relay maintenance procedure. Similar inservice relay testing was halted until the procedure is updated. DCPP determined that the main feedwater pump trip occurred due to loss of power to the in-service control pump (caused by the 480 V bus deenergization) and the inability of the backup control oil system to respond quickly enough due to nitrogen pre-charge leakage from an accumulator bladder. The bladder was replaced and the system tested. Other corrective actions are also being implemented. This event did not adversely affect the health or safety of the public.

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