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PROS 2015 Summer Meeting

2015 PROS Meeting will be in Texas.

A NASA tour is planned. You will love the Gulf Coast. Plan your meeting now, and have some fun too.

Read page two. News continues, don't stop on page one.

NRC To Begin Full Certification Review of APR1400 Reactor

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has docketed for review Korea Electric Power Corp. and 

Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power’s application to certify the APR1400 reactor design for use in the United States. 

The companies submitted their revised application for the design, an approximately 1,400 MWe pressurized-water reactor based on the Korean Optimized Power Reactor 1000, on Dec. 23, 2014. The NRC, after conducting an acceptance check, has concluded the application is complete enough for a full design certification review. The staff will provide a review schedule in the near future. 

The NRC’s certification process determines whether a reactor design meets the basic U.S. safety requirements. Companies can then reference a certified design in applying for a Combined License to build and operate a reactor in the United States. The NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards provides input on design certification reviews. If issued, certifications are valid for 15 years. 

The NRC has most recently certified Westinghouse’s AP1000 and GE-Hitachi’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor designs. 

HOPE CREEK: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELEVATED TRITIUM DETECTED ONSITE

n March 3, 2015, PSEG [Public Service Enterprise Group] confirmed the presence of tritium at a concentration of approximately [0.001] microCurie/ml in ice samples taken in a small area immediately adjacent to the north side of the Hope Creek Turbine Building. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Nuclear Engineering was notified at 1408 [EST] on March 4, 2015, in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative. 

"Samples were taken and analyzed in response to ice which was observed to be forming along the exterior of the north Turbine Building wall.

WOLF CREEK: SUPPLEMENTAL WORKER FOUND WITH SYNTHETIC URINE

A non-licensed, non-supervisory supplemental worker was found with synthetic urine on their person during a search at the security entrance station. The individual's access was terminated on site and in PADS. 

NRC Safety Culture Policy Statement Update - March 2015

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) defines nuclear safety culture as the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.

The NRC recognizes that it is important for all organizations performing or overseeing regulated activities to establish and maintain a positive safety culture commensurate with the safety and security significance of their activities and the nature and complexity of their organizations and functions.  T

LINK: NRC SAFETY CULTURE INFORMATION

AP1000 Simulator Inspections Scheduled This Year

by Bob Meyer

Both Vogtle and V.C. Summer AP1000 Nuclear Plants have gained INPO Accreditation Status a couple years ago. With this status, based on the systems approach to training (SAT) program accreditatin, and the NRCs participation in the accreditation board, the NRC does not perform selected training inspections. The waiver of the training program inspections are also waived at all the othe nuclear plants that are accredited through INPO. 

The NRC intends to conduct simulator inspections on the V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 simulators used for the SAT program when it is appropriate.

Vogle AP1000 simulator inspectins are scheduled for this year. IP 41502 part one will be conducted early this year and part two later this year.

For Vogtle Units 3 and 4, the NRC determined the performance during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC’s Construction Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low (i.e., green) safety significance. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct only baseline inspections at the construction site.

PSEG Early Site Permit Application Docket No. 52-043 Information in Support of Early Site Permit Application

by Bob Meyer

PSEG submitted a letter to the NRC concerning supplemental information in support of the PSEG Early Site Permit (ESP) Application. On January 9, 2015, NRC staff and a representative from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted an audit with members of the New Jersey Historical Preservation Office (NJ-HPO) to discuss concerns identified by the NJ-HPO during their review of the NRC's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the PSEG ESP Application. During the audit the NRC and USACE staff, NJ-HPO members and PSEG Nuclear Development personnel conducted field observations to assess the visual impact to selected historic properties in the vicinity of the proposed PSEG Site. During the field observations numerous photographs were taken to record the visual impact to the selected historic properties. 

This application for PSEG's Early Site Permit indicates that the Nuclear Industry is moving forward, howbeit at a seemingly slow snail's pace.

Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 LER: High Cycle Fatigue Resulted in Reactor Coolant Leak and Unit Shutdown

On November 8, 2013, the Oconee Unit 1 Control Room received an alarm associated with the containment atmosphere particulate radiation monitor. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage of <0.1 gpm was identified. On November 11, 2013, upon verification of un-isolable reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage on the 1B2 High Pressure Injection (HPI) Injection line, Oconee Unit 1 was shut down as required by Technical Specifications. The shutdown was orderly and without complication. The cause evaluation determined that mechanical, high-cycle fatigue resulted in a through wall crack in the stainless steel butt weld between the HPI nozzle safe end and HPI piping. Ownership and oversight of the augmented examination program was inadequate, as was guidance to the examiners for actions to be taken when full weld volume coverage could not be achieved.

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), as completion of a shutdown required by Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), degradation of a principal safety barrier. High pressure injection capability was maintained, and containment integrity was not impacted. This report has been revised to reflect the results of the completed root cause evaluation.

EVALUATION:

BACKGROUND

STAFF REQUIREMENTS – COMSECY-14-0041 – YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to: (1) develop and issue the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) supplement; and (2) proceed with proposed safety evaluation report (SER) wrap-up activities. 

The Commission has also approved Option 2 for making the Licensing Support Network (LSN) documents available to the public through ADAMS with enhanced search capability. However, this activity should be initiated no earlier than the close of the public comment period on the draft EIS supplement. This timing will allow the staff to gauge its resource estimates for completing and issuing the EIS supplement. 

The Commission also approves the lessons learned activities for the SER, but as a lower priority than the other items. 

Consistent with 10 CFR 2.1011, responsibility for the LSN document activities should not reside with the staff. Rather, LSN document activities should be coordinated by SECY and the ASLBP as appropriate. 

The staff should continue to provide monthly status reports to the relevant Congressional Committees. The staff should reach out to Congress after it submits its first monthly report after the final SER is issued to determine whether Congress concurs with receiving quarterly reports and report back to the Commission. 

If any issues arise that may require Commission intervention, the staff should promptly alert the Commission and seek guidance. 

OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT REGULATORY ACTION: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION; NRC 95002 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT

This is to inform the Commission that two White Significance Determination Process (SDP) findings will be issued on or around January 26, 2015, to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station as a result of an NRC 95002 supplemental inspection at the facility. These two parallel performance inspection findings are being opened and given the same color as the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator (PI) (White) and Unplanned Scrams with Complications PI (White) in accordance with Section 11.02 from Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. This guidance document requires a parallel PI inspection finding be opened and given the same color as the PI if there are significant weaknesses in the licensee’s evaluation of a performance issue associated with a PI. 

The parallel inspection findings for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours and Unplanned Scrams with Complications PIs should take effect at the beginning of the quarter the PI returned to Green. The findings will then be removed from consideration of future agency action (per the Action Matrix) in the quarter following the successful completion of the follow-up supplemental inspection. The findings will not be double-counted in the assessment process. 

These findings do not involve violations of any NRC requirements. 

The licensee has not yet been informed of the specific nature of the regulatory action. 

The schedule of issuance and notification is: 

Mailing of Final Significance Determination January 26, 2015 

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