Dry Cask Storage Violation - PSEG Nuclear LLC Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem Nuclear Generating Station
The inspectors reviewed PSEG Nuclear LLC's (PSEG's) activities associated with the use of an incorrect method for calculating the heat load (Qrcoq) for 13 loaded spent fuel casks. The condition was documented in PSEG's corrective action program in notifications 20530707, 20532615, and 20532467. The inspectors interviewed PSEG and Holtec International (Holtec) personnel and reviewed PSEG and Holtec documents and procedures. The inspectors also reviewed PSEG's apparent cause evaluation report and corrective actions.
Based on the results of this inspection, a Severity Level (SL) lV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Condition 2 of Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1014, Amendment 5, was identified. PSEG's procedures SC.MD-FR.DCS-0002(Q), "Dry Cask Storage Fuel Selection for Cask Loading" and HC.MD-FR.DCS-0002(Q), "Dry Cask Storage Fuel Selection for Cask Loading" were not consistent with the technical basis described in Chapter 8 of the HI-STORM Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) because they did not contain the correct methodology to calculate the cask Qrcocl. As a result, in 2010 and 2011, the Qtcocl, was incorrectly calculated for casks loaded at Salem (93, 94, 95, 96, 128, 129,130, 131, and 132) and Hope Creek (155, 156, 157, and 158); which, then caused the casks to be backfilled with less helium then specified in the technical specifications. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into PSEG's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors determined that this violation did not involve a Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) finding, therefore no cross-cutting issue was assigned.
PSEG performed technical evaluations and recalculated the total cask decay heat for the 13 casks identified in PSEG's corrective action program notifications in accordance with Holtec FSAR, Revision 7. PSEG determined that the 13 casks had a greater heat load than previously thought such that they would have required to have been backfilled with a larger amount of helium than they received in order to be in compliance with Technical Specifications (TS) 3.1 .1.
Steve Baker - Nuclear Fuels Contractor
Paul Bonnett - Senior Compliance Engineer - Hope Creek
Philip Duca - Senior Compliance Engineer - Hope Creek
Paul Duke - Licensing Manager
Mike Gaffney - Hope Creek Regulatory Assurance Manager
Brian Gustems - Manager - Fuel Supply and Technical Support
Brian Gutherman, P.E. President -Gutherman Technical Services, LLC
Evrim Kalfazade, Holtec lnternational, Adjunct Program Manager
David Lefleur - Compliance Engineer - Salem
Peter Macconi - Outage Services - DCS Task Manager
Debabrata Mitra-Majumdar, Holtec International, Program Manager
John Perry - Hope Creek Site Vice President
Glenn Schwartz - PSEG Nuc Fuels, Fuel Performance Program Engineer