NRC - Current Event Notification Report for September 2, 2010 (LaSalle, Palisades, Indian Point)

LASALLE - 60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION IN LIEU OF A WRITTEN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT OF INVALID ACTUATION - "On July 26, 2010, at 1819 hours [CDT], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Run), the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) restarted after being secured. The DGCWP provides the Emergency Service Water to the 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room area cooler and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) water pump/Low Pressure Core Spray [LPCS] pump room area cooler.

"The apparent cause of the restart was the momentary interruption of the DGCWP run logic. The Division 1 DGCWP was in operation to support cooling of the Unit 1 RCIC/LPCS pump room area (run logic satisfied). When the Operator placed the Division 1 DGCWP control switch to the normal-after-stop position, the DGCWP feed breaker opened. The Operator reset the DGCWP feed breaker trip by returning the control switch to the normal-after-stop position and, because the run logic for the DGCWP was still satisfied [due to elevated room temperatures], the DGCWP restarted.

"This invalid start signal from the Division 1 DGCWP breaker being reset resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DGCWP. The Division 1 DGCWP responded satisfactorily.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), which states that in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center with 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER."

INDIAN POINT - LOSS OF TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION - "On September 1, 2010 at 1600 hrs. [it was] identified that the 21 and 22 Hot Leg Remote Shutdown Temperature Instruments are inoperable. This constitutes a safety system functional failure which is reportable. The cause of the inoperability is under investigation. Per Technical Specification 3.3.4, these instruments must be restored to operable status within 30 days."

PALISADES - LOSS OF LOAD TRIP SIGNAL ON ALL FOUR CHANNELS OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM - "On August 23, 2010, at approximately 2210 hours, with the Palisades unit at 100% power, the turbine protection relays, 305L and 305R, were identified as being inoperable due to a loss of electrical power from their 125 VDC power supply. On an actual turbine low auto stop oil pressure condition, 305L and 305R energize to generate a loss of load trip signal to all four channels of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). 305L provides input to RPS channels A and C. 305R provides input to RPS channels B and D. The RPS generates a reactor trip upon receipt of two (2) of four (4) loss of load trip signals. The loss of load trip is required by Technical Specification (TS) Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and was inoperable until 305L and 305R were reenergized on August 24, 2010, at approximately 0939 hours.

"The on-shift operations crew entered a TS 3.3.1 LCO, however, TS 3.0.3 LCO should have also been entered. TS 3.0.3 LCO was applicable due to all four (4) loss of load input signals to the RPS being inoperable. The eight (8) hour notification was not reported within the required time frame due to a misinterpretation of the event that has since been re-evaluated and determined to meet the eight hour immediate notification requirement.

"The safety significance of this even was minimal. Although required by TS, the loss of load trip function is not credited in the plant safety analysis.