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PROS 2015 Summer Meeting

2015 PROS Meeting will be in Texas.

A NASA tour is planned. You will love the Gulf Coast. Plan your meeting now, and have some fun too.

Read page two. News continues, don't stop on page one.

Lockheed looks for partners on its proposed fusion reactor

Tom McGuire with the first phase of Lockheed Martin’s compact fusion reactor.

Tom McGuire with the first phase of Lockheed Martin’s compact fusion reactor

The leader of a proposed compact fusion reactor project says that Lockheed Martin’s decision to lift the lid on its secret effort is an attempt to build a scientific team and find partners.

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4 – U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT - October 17, 2014

This report documents one inspector-identified finding of very low security significance (i.e., Green), as determined by the Construction Fitness-for-Duty Significance Determination Process, that was identified during this inspection. The deficiency was corrected or compensated for, and the plant was in compliance with applicable physical protection and security requirements within the scope of this inspection, before the inspectors left the site. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Work Practices (b), because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel following procedures and work instructions. 

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT - October 10, 2014

On August 28, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems 

Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, App. B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for the licensee’s failure to perform operability determinations on degraded boundaries with credited compensatory measures in accordance with Wolf Creek Procedure AP 26C-004, “Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment.” Specifically, operations staff were stationing boundary watches to shut blocked open doors credited for maintaining operability of safety related components in the event of a high-energy line break in the turbine building. There was no reasonable assurance that an operator would be able to close these doors during a high-energy line break event.

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in resources in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures were adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, Wolf Creek Procedure AP 10 104, “Breech Authorization,” Revision 30, led operators to believe that operability determinations were not required for degraded boundaries and that a boundary watch was an adequate compensatory measure for a high-energy line break, despite clear guidance to the contrary in Procedure AP 26C-004 [H.1].

NRC Renews Operating Licenses of Limerick Nuclear Plant for an Additional 20 Years

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has renewed the operating licenses of the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, for an additional 20 years of operation. The new licenses will expire Oct. 26, 2044, for Unit 1 and June 22, 2049, for Unit 2. 

The Limerick plant has two boiling water reactors and is located in Limerick Township, Pa., about 21 miles northwest of Philadelphia. Exelon Generation Co. LLC submitted the license renewal application on June 22, 2011. The NRC staff’s review of the application proceeded on two tracks. A safety evaluation report was issued Jan. 10, 2013, and supplemented on Aug. 12, 2014. A supplemental environmental impact statement was published Aug. 27, 2014. These documents, as well as other information on the Limerick license renewal, are available on the NRC website. 

Renewal of the Limerick licenses brings to 75 the number of commercial nuclear power reactors with renewed licenses. Applications for an additional 17 renewals are currently under review. Information about those reviews can be found on the NRC website. 

Farley, Unit 1 LER:B-Train RHR Inoperable for Longer Than Allowed byTechnical Specifications due to Misadjusted

On February 28, 2014 at 1300, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent themnal power, a lower than expected flow rate in the B-Train Residual Heat Removal (RHR)system was observed while conducting a surveillance test per procedure FNP-1-STP-11.2. Investigation of this condition determined that the low flow rate was a result of previous maintenance perfomned on October 13,2013 to replace an actuator linkage on the B-Train RHR heat exchanger discharge valve, 1El1HCV603B. Analysis of the February 28, 2014 test results determined that the B-train RHR system flow rate was essthan the minimum allowed byTechnical Specifications, rendering the B-TrainRHRsystem inoperable. Since this condition has existed for a time period in excess ofthe applicable Technical Specification Required Action Completion ime, this is a violation ofTechnical Specifications and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Since theA-Train of HR has been brieflyinoperable during the period of B-TrainRHR inoperability, this is also reportable per 10 CFR 0.73(a)(2)(v)(B,D).

PERRY: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOSS OF FEEDWATER

The Perry Power Plant experienced a reactor scram during a shift of non-essential vital power supply to the alternate source. Feedwater was lost resulting in receiving a valid level 3 and level 2 signal. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling started and injected. Reactor level and pressure have been stabilized to required bands. The motor feed pump has been started and is controlling level.

SALEM: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP RESULTING IN AUX FEEDWATER ACTUATION

This is an 8-hour notification being made to report that a valid ESF [emergency safety features] auxiliary feed water system actuation occurred. Salem Unit 1 was in mode 1 at 19% reactor power and executed a planned manual reactor trip to begin a scheduled refueling outage (1R23). The 11, 12, and 13 AFW [auxiliary feedwater] pumps were not in service prior to the reactor trip and as a result, narrow range levels in 12, 13, and 14 steam generators reached 14% before recovering. This resulted in a valid ESF actuation for low steam generator water level.

TURKEY POINT: TWO INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS OF SAFETY INJECTION

his 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report [two separate] invalid actuations of the Unit 4 Safety Injection (SI) System in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). 

RIVER BEND: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON HIGH AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR FLUX

At 0303 [CDT], River Bend Nuclear Station sustained a reactor scram due to high Average Power Range Monitor [APRM] flux, suspected due to a malfunction of the Electrohydraulic Control System. Reactor recirculation pump 'B' tripped, reactor recirculation pump 'A' responded appropriately. All other systems responded appropriately except for loss of feed water due to low suction pressure trip from isolating the condensate demineralizers. Reactor water level did not get out of level band. Condensate demineralizers and feedwater were restored to service. Level 3 [isolation] was initiated due to scram. [One] system, Suppression Pool Cooling isolated accordingly due to level 3 signal. Currently the plant is in mode 3, hot shutdown.

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