On April 27, 2012, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with Inservice Inspection Program requirements. Examinations were being performed to identify flaws before they grow to a size that could effect the structural integrity of the reactor vessel. Those examinations identified flaws in four head penetration nozzles that exhibited characteristics of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking. The four nozzles were repaired using the inner diameter temper bead welding process. Examinations performed following the repairs confirmed the repairs were successful.

"This was originally submitted as a voluntary report on May 29, 2012 at 1511 EDT. The condition has since been determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

NRC Notified By: JOHN CAVES
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $70,000 civil penalty against the Tennessee Valley Authority for violations related to the commercial grade dedication program during the construction of Watts Bar nuclear plant Unit 2. The Watts Bar plant, where one unit has been in operation since 1996, is located near Spring City, Tenn., about 60 miles southwest of Knoxville.

The NRC requires certain components in a nuclear plant to meet strict nuclear quality assurance standards. Commercial grade dedication is a process that provides reasonable assurance that components purchased from a commercial supplier are equivalent to nuclear grade items. This assurance is achieved through documented inspections, tests or analyses.

An NRC inspection conducted in late 2012 and early this year identified three violations related to the Watts Bar Unit 2 commercial grade dedication program. NRC inspectors found a breakdown in the program resulting in construction of unknown quality, a failure to report that breakdown and a failure to identify that issue as a significant condition affecting quality.

“While TVA has aggressively addressed these issues, the violations and proposed civil penalty emphasize the importance of an effective quality assurance program during construction as well as prompt identification and reporting of any related breakdowns,” said NRC Region II Deputy Administrator for Construction Fred Brown.

Since 2008, PPL has been issued three Severity Level (SL) IV violations and one SL III violation related to the medical qualifications of its licensed reactor operators. As a result of these, and other licensed operator reporting issues (some licensee-identified), PPL staff completed a detailed evaluation of these repetative problems, PPL staff reviewed the medical records of all of its licensed operators and, as a result, on July 20, 2012, submitted ten medical updates to the NRC. Four of the ten updates involved permanent changes in medical conditions that had not been previously submitted within the required 30 days. The other six submittals involved conditions that PPL initially stated were being provided to the NRC “for information only.” However, the NRC independently identified (i.e., as a result of reviews conducted by the NRC contract physicians) that three of these six “Information Only” submittals actually involved operators with permanent changes in medical conditions. These medical conditions did not meet the minimum standards to conduct licensed activities and, therefore, the affected operators should have been removed from licensed activities or conditions added to their licenses before being permitted to continue watch standing. In addition, in December 2012, PPL submitted updates to the NRC for three other individuals that had medical conditions (sleep apnea) that had not been reported in a timely manner as required.

The NRC examiners administered an initial license examination operating test during the week of April 29, 2013, and on May 8, 2013. The written examination was administered by Byron Station Training Department personnel on May 7, 2013. Eight Senior Reactor Operators and two Reactor Operator applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on May 31, 2013. All applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued applicable operator licenses.

Findings

The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether a senior emergency planner, formerly employed at Arkansas Nuclear One, falsified documents related to miscellaneous drills and surveillances required by the facility emergency plan. The results of the investigation, including the identification of an apparent violation.

The violation involves the deliberate falsification of documents regarding the performance of Emergency Preparedness drills and communication surveillances by a senior emergency planner formerly employed by Arkansas Nuclear One. It should be noted that although the individual was a senior emergency planner, the individual did not have supervisory duties. The senior emergency planner documented that the drills and surveillances were completed when in fact they had not been performed.

During an NRC investigation conducted from April 4 through December 14, 2012, at Arkansas Nuclear One, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50.9(a), requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee, or information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee, shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

10 CFR 50.71, requires, in part, that each licensee shall maintain all records, in connection with the activity, as may be required by the regulations.

At approximately 1615 CDT on June 17, 2013, station personnel identified a potential unanalyzed condition based on the following:

"The 1998 design calculation for the carbon dioxide fire suppression system protecting the Relay Room is in part based on an unverified leakage rate for the enclosure. Recent testing and subsequent calculations have found the room leakage rate is higher than the leakage rate specified in the 1998 design calculation. As such, more carbon dioxide would be required to meet design requirements. The minimum required level for the system storage tank would not currently provide two shots of carbon dioxide (design requirement) to suppress a fire.

"The minimum required quantity in the tank would be sufficient to provide one shot of carbon dioxide to suppress a fire; however, since this doesn't meet the design requirement, a continuous fire watch was initiated."

NRC Notified By: WAYNE EPPEN
10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP

Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was declared non-functional at 1111 hours. As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 1125 hours. No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 55% power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 1811 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established.

NRC Notified By: JIM KURAS
10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP (SNUPPS)

LONDON (Reuters) - EDF Energy, Britain's largest nuclear power producer, stopped its 610-megawatt (MW) Heysham 1-2 nuclear unit on Monday for planned refuelling, the company said.

"Heysham 1 unit 2 shut down at 0001 BST Monday June 17 for its planned refuelling outage," a spokesman said in a statement.

The utility's latest outage schedule showed the unit was planned to restart production on June 29.

(Reporting by Karolin Schaps; editing by Tom Pfeiffer)

After pump issues forced Hope Creek 1 to shut down last week due to a failure of one of the stations three circ pumps, Thursday a small leak in the residual heat removal system was discovered.

A report released Friday discussed a leak of less than 1 gallon per minute was found from a 40 percent circumferential crack in a weld in the RHR vent line adjacent to the outboard isolation valve.