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PROS 2015 Summer Meeting

2015 PROS Meeting will be in Texas.

A NASA tour is planned. You will love the Gulf Coast. Plan your meeting now, and have some fun too.

Read page two. News continues, don't stop on page one.


At 0422 CDT on 5/5/2015, with Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 2, and the 1A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, the 1B SGFP was manually tripped during troubleshooting. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the MDAFWPs [motor driven aux feedwater pumps] due to the auto start signal not being defeated. Both MDAFW pumps were in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG) when the actuation signal was received. The effects of the auto start signal were to fully open the AFW Flow Control Valves and isolate SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves. These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset. There was no adverse impact to the plant and decay heat continued to be removed through the condenser throughout the event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION

The IAEA Takes its Nuclear Security Plan to Diplomats in New York

On 29 April 2015 delegates gathered on the sidelines of the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at United Nations headquarters in New York to discuss the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017.

The discussion was led by Geoffrey Shaw, the representative of IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano at the United Nations.

The presentation covered the nature of modern nuclear security threats, measures being used to combat these threats, international instruments, such as treaties, safety standards and guidelines, and the role of the IAEA in the global nuclear security framework.

Flood risk to nuclear sites raises meltdown fears

Safety checks following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in March 2011, when a 10 metre-high sea wall was overtopped by a tsunami, have shown that nuclear plants are at greater risk of catastrophic flooding as a result of climate change.

All nuclear plants need large quantities of water for cooling so all must be built close to the sea, large rivers or lakes. This makes them vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surges and to the possible collapse of large dams upstream from poor construction, floodwater or seismic activity.

Small robot to enter No. 2 reactor in Fukushima nuclear power plant

Small robot to enter No. 2 reactor in Fukushima nuclear power plant

A new small robot will be used to inspect the condition of melted nuclear fuel at the second reactor of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant as early as this summer, marking the first full-scale probe since the disaster caused by the massive earthquake and ensuing tsunami in 2011.

The use of the robot, which is now being developed, will mark the initial step toward removal of the melted fuel from Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s nuclear facility, which may begin in 2021, according to sources close to TEPCO and other related entities.


On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an examination at Seabrook Station, Unit 1. The examination included the evaluation of four applicants for reactor operator licenses, three applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and two applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses.

On March 31, 2015, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all nine applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on April 3, 2015. 

Palo Verde Unit 2 LER: Technical Specification (TS) Required Plant Shutdown Due to a Dropped Control Element Assembly

On November 6, 2014, at approximately 1116 Mountain Standard Time, Unit 2 was in Mode 1,100 percent power, when control element assembly (CEA) 15 dropped fully into the core while the 88 other CEAs remained fully withdrawn. Operations entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.5, Condition A, for one CEA misaligned from its group which requires a power reduction and restoration of CEA alignment. An initial power reduction was performed in accordance with TSs and attempts to repair the problem were initiated. The CEA could not be aligned within the 2 hour TS time limit and TS LCO 3.1.5, Condition C was entered at 1316 which required entry into Mode 3 within 6 hours. The power reduction was continued and the reactor was manually shutdown at 1636 to comply with TSs.

The direct cause of the event was a failed upper gripper coil on the control element drive mechanism (CEDM) for CEA 15. The failed coil was replaced and Unit 2 was restarted and entered Mode 1 at 0332 on November 13, 2014. Operation of the coil at elevated temperatures accelerated thermal degradation of the coil insulation. A preventive maintenance strategy for establishing coil voltages and online CEDM coil monitoring, and adjustment, if necessary, was implemented.

In the previous 3 years, similar events related to malfunctions of control element drive mechanism control system equipment that resulted in a plant shutdown were reported in LERs 50-528/2011-004, 50-528/2011-005 and 50-530/2012-001.


The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. 

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On May 4, 2015 at 0320, seismic monitoring (SM) system force balance accelerometer R0006 was determined to be non-functional due to an emergent equipment failure.


On May 4, 2015 at 1439 [EDT], during maintenance activities on Unit 2 Zone 3 fan discharge exhaust dampers, the control room received a low DP [Differential Pressure] alarm and other confirmatory indications of a loss of building DP. 

Secondary Containment DP was restored after approximately 2 minutes.


NRC documented one finding of in this report. Great OE... 

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